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1 Introduction
The effects of climate change are already so apparent
that those who doubt the existence of the
phenomenon are now in aminority.Theremay still
be controversy over the cause or causes, but
evidence of substantial change is building at a
remarkable rate. In Britain, winters are shorter and
agricultural patterns are changing. There are now
commercial vineyards in the north of England and
gardeners experiment with subtropical exotics
across much of the country. In the subarctic regions
such as Alaska, changes are especially obvious as
large areas of permafrost begin tomelt and ice-free
sea passages increase each winter, and even in the
tropics, Mount Kenya andMount Kilimanjaro now
look likely to lose their snowfields. This article
analyses why the implications of these changes
have, for themost part, not been seen as a security
issue, or even ones that havemuch connection with
development. The article suggests this is due to the
fact that the first decade of climate science focused
on likely changes in the northern hemisphere rather
than the tropics and the modelling was based on a
view of climate change as a slow and steadily
advancing phenomenon with potential benefits for
the northern hemisphere and limited impacts in
the tropics.More recent research has changed this
picture: substantial impacts are expected in the
tropics and there is greater awareness that climate
change may produce abrupt changes and shocks
as well as gradual changes.To the extent these occur
in fragile societies with limited coping capacity,
both could trigger increased crime, social unrest
and pressure for large-scale migration. These have
implications for global security that are not well
understood providing an additional reason why
climate change has low priority on international
and national political agendas.
2 Climate science: the first decade
In the ordinary way, climate change has been a
concernmainly for the wildlife enthusiasts and for
those who see a risk of a runaway and irreversible
greenhouse effect developing – a climatic disaster
ending up with the Earth having a hothouse
atmosphere like Venus. In other respects, many
have welcomed the onset of climate change, with
these ranging from ordinary people in countries
such as Britain, Canada or Russia, to convinced
free-marketers who believe that climate change will
produce new economic opportunities.
Occasionally, there is an unexpected warning
signal.A recent study done for the Pentagon talked
of the risk of rapid climatic changes affecting regions
such as the USA and Western Europe, leading to
major events such as droughts, violent storms and
sudden changes in temperature (Schwartz and
Randal 2003). One concern is that the melting of
arctic ice deposits could affect the circulation of
warm Atlantic currents with a massive impact on
NorthAmerica andWestern Europe.On such rare
occasions, attentionmay be drawn to possible links
with security, but for themost part, climate change
has simply not been seen as a security issue or even
one that has much connection with development.
One of the principle reasons for this is that most
climate changemodels have tended, in the past, to
predict that the major changes would affect the
temperate regions of the world, both north and
south, with the overall effect being one of slow steady
warming together with the risk of some changes in
rainfall patterns and a certain increase in storm
intensity. For two quite different reasons, these
possibilities have caused relatively little concern.
One is that any change in climate that leads to
a slow increase in temperatures inNorth America,
Europe and North Asia was generally seen as
something of an advantage – allowing arable and
pastoral farming to thrive further north, improving
the living conditions of many millions of people
and even leading to a decrease in energy
requirements.Moreover, these regions include the
most powerful economies with a dominant political
influence in international affairs.
Second, if climate change was to increase in
speed so that there were substantial impacts, then
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since its effect would be disproportionately on the
richest countries, it can be argued that these would
be the countries best able to cope. The tropical
regions, by contrast, include almost all the less
developed countries.While these would be far less
able to handle rapid climate change, the early
evidence seemed to suggest that they would be far
less affected.
There were certainly some caveats to this broad
characterisation of such a generally optimistic view
of early climate science. One was that some
substantial economies, such as those of Spain, Italy
and Australia, had agricultural sectors that were
heavily water-dependent in regions of increasing
water scarcity. Just about any change in climate
involving a decrease in rainfall could have a
substantial effect. Another problem was that if
climate change was eventually to involve substantial
increases in sea level, then this would be on a global
scale and would seriously affect a number of island
states and also some heavily populated deltas such
as the Ganges/Brahmaputra and the Mekong and
major conurbations such as those centred on
Shanghai, Mumbai and Calcutta.
Furthermore, while the El Niño effect may not
be directly related to human-induced climate
change, one of the experiences of recent El Niños
has been the global impact, with this east Pacific
maritime phenomenon having an effect stretching
right across South and South East-Asia and across
the Indian Ocean to Africa. At the very least, this
has been an educative experience for many in terms
of the dynamic nature of the global climate.
These exceptions apart, climate change was not
widely thought to be a problem that would greatly
worry the body politic in the elite world of the
northern industrial states. The general view was
that climate change might happen, it might affect
the temperate latitudes, but slow improvements in
carbon emission controls coupled with the
responsive potential of powerful economies would
be a sufficient reply.
3 Climate science: subsequent
developments
What has changed and has given climate change a
much greater security dimension, is a recognition
in the Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange
(IPCC)’s ThirdAssessment Report andmore recent
research is that the patterns of future change are
likely to be quite different from those predicted by
the early climate change research of ten years or
more ago, and this relates specifically to the impact
on the tropics.
One of the core reasons why this has only recently
come to the fore is that there appeared to be good
evidence for the view that the impact of climate
change on the tropics would be limited, because
this appeared tobe the pattern withprevious natural
climate cycles. In the last IceAge, for example, Britain
was largely glaciated as far south as the Thames
valley, andmuch ofNorthAmerica,WesternEurope
and North Asia were similarly affected. But while
this was going on, only 1,000 miles or so to the
south, there was relatively little change.
The reasons for this were not fully understood,
nor was it clear that what was true for natural
climatic cycles would also be true for human-
induced climate change. Indeed, some of the early
computer-generated climate models did actually
predict an impact on the tropics, but climatologists
were somewhat reluctant to accept this modelling
in the face of some pretty strong evidence from a
range of historical records. If, in the broad sweep
of history, there were unknown climate factors that
tended to “buffer” any global effects on the tropics,
then one had to be cautious in suggesting that such
factors could not also respond to human-induced
climate change, thereby moderating its impact.
What is now becoming apparent is that human-
induced climate change is likely to have a substantial
impact on the tropical regions, that this impact
should be expected to be thoroughly unhelpful and
that the political and security implications are
potentially immense. At the core of this reasoning
is that human-induced climate change is likely to
have a profound impact on the global distribution
of rainfall, and that the impact will have four
elements.
One is that there may not be major changes in
rainfall patterns in the more northerly latitudes,
between 50 and 60 degrees north. The second,
though, is that there will be an increase in
precipitation (rain and snow) in the northern and
southern polar regions and the third is that there
will be more rainfall over the oceans. The fourth
and crucial element is that there will be much less
rainfall over the tropical landmasses. In short, the
tropical regions will tend to dry out (for an early
account of this, see Rind 1995).
There may be some mitigating factors, in that
themain greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, will tend
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to enhance crop yields as it increases in
concentration in the atmosphere, and there is still
a large element of caution about the impact of this
tropical “drying-out”, with some differences of
opinion among specialists.
There are, though, three further issues to factor
in.The first is that most climate change researchhas
tended to concentrate on assessing the impact on
advanced economies, since these are the economies
that financemost of the research.While modelling
might necessarily be done on a global scale, scenario
generation is disproportionately directed towards
theNorth, to the partial neglect of the tropics.Thus,
our understanding of the details of the impact of
climate change on the tropics is inadequate.
The second issue is that even natural climate
cycles can bemuchmore rapid than was previously
thought. The last Ice Age in Europe, for example,
now appears to have receded in decades rather than
centuries, and the implication of this is that human-
induced climate changemay also be similarly rapid.
The third issue is that increases in temperature
in the tropics are likely to lead to more intense
tropical storms, yet it is apparent that such storms
have a much greater human impact in poorer
countries than those that are better able to cope. In
1992, Hurricane Andrew hit parts of the southern
USA. A total of 52 people were killed and the
damage was estimated at US$22 billion, over 70
per cent of it covered by insurance. Six years later,
Hurricane Mitch hit Nicaragua and Honduras. A
total of 11,000 people died and only 3 per cent of
theUS$7 billion damage was covered by insurance
(see also Hamilton, in this Bulletin).
4 Security and development
linkages: crime, migration and
social unrest
Taking all of these issues together, we are left with
the strong possibility that the real social, economic
and political significance of climate change will be
its impact on the tropical regions, including those
regions characterised by population density and
impoverishment that would be least able to cope.
We are already in a global economy that has
major problems of socio-economic division, with
an elite of around one billion people doing
conspicuously well, while an increasingly
knowledgeablemajority tending to bemarginalised.
These elites may be concentrated principally in the
countries of the Atlantic community and theWest
Pacific, but they are present, to an extent, in most
poorer countries. The divisions have the potential
to fuel what has been described as a “revolution of
frustrated expectations”, which in turn has several
expressions.
One has been the pronounced tendency towards
high crime rates, especially in urbanising areas, and
another has been the development of radical social
movements such as SenderoLuminoso, theNepalese
Maoists, numerous secessionist movements and a
range of movements arising from fundamental
religious beliefs, not least within Islam, Hinduism
and Christianity. In the current context, though,
perhaps the most significant trend has been the
changes in patterns of economic and political
migration, especially where relatively wealthy regions
are in proximity to those that are distinctly less so.
What has to be faced is the possibility that
environmental constraints relating to climate change
will have a further substantial impact on both of
these latter trends – radical social movements and
migration. The reasoning here is that if there is a
substantial “drying out” of the tropics in the next
three to four decades, then this will have an impact
on the ecological carrying-capacity of a range of
productive tropical croplands that currently support
a substantial part of the entire global population,
often still by subsistence farming.
If such a carrying-capacity is decreased, then a
substantial increase inmigratory pressures is to be
expected. Given that there is already a marked
antagonism to such trends in countries such as
Australia, as well as many Western European states,
such pressures will be resisted, with force if
necessary. In this context, it is relevant to note the
re-orientation of the maritime forces of countries
such as Spain, Italy and France away from the
east–west axis of the Cold War era to the
north–southMediterranean axis of the new century.
Resisting such migratory pressures is likely, in
turn, to fuel a social and political radicalisation in
those regions most under stress, with that potentially
expressing itself in anti-elite movements that may
be transnational in impact. In essence, the impact
of climate change on the tropics may not be somuch
a case of having entirely new social and security
consequences, but more of enhancing existing
instabilities.
Although there remain some uncertainties, the
current fragile state of international security would
indicate that it will be wise to assume that there
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will indeed be an additional and substantial impact
of climate change on the poorer societies in the
world community, with the probable consequences
outlined above.
5 Future actions
Responses would appear tobe required at three levels.
The first is to greatly increase the research devoted
to climatology and closely related fields such as
oceanography and global ecosystem studies, with
the emphasis being placed on tropical systems and
their likely modification. The second is to work on
the assumption that such climate change will happen,
at least to an extent, and fund those adaptations that
might somewhat ameliorate the effects (discussed
inmore detail by Huq and Reid, Hamilton, Denton
and Scoones in this Bulletin). These would include
substantial efforts to orientate agricultural systems
in general, and crop breeding in particular, to lower
levels of rainfall in given areas (see Devereux and
Edwards this Bulletin).
Finally, the likely impact of climate change on
the tropics will be such that there is a requirement
for amuch greater effort to control greenhouse gas
emissions, with most of the effort necessarily
undertaken by those states that are the most
substantial polluters.Given the recent withdrawal
of theUSA from the rather modest Kyoto Protocol
on climate change, this is a tall order. Even Britain,
which is rather better than some other industrial
states, is far behind what is required. It is probable
that Britain will cut greenhouse gas emissions by
around 10 per cent over the next decade or so. The
requirement, if Britain was serious in controlling
climate change, is a 60 per cent reduction.
Thus, the political will is currently not in
evidence, either in Britain or elsewhere. Perhaps if
it becomes more apparent that climate change is
likely to contribute to producing a highly unstable
and insecure international system, then the issue
might rise rather higher up the political agenda.
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